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CASE NOTES
rial in terms of content only if it does so to define the locations at which
material of this kind is available.5
2
The restricting of public access to constitutionally protected materials
becomes a significant concern when addressing the first amendment im-
plications of municipal ordinances regulating the locations of businesses
distributing sexually oriented entertainment. 53 When municipalities ex-
ercise their police powers to protect city neighborhoods against deteriora-
tion, they must not infringe upon freedom of expression.54 Instead, they
must draw regulations narrowly enough to minimize the impact that
state action has on first amendment guarantees. 55 If such action serves to
severely curtail the public's access to protected sexually oriented mate-
rial, it will be struck down as unconstitutional.56 As Alexander indicates,
the courts will continue to give priority to first amendment rights unless
the government can demonstrate a legitimate and substantial interest for
making a limited exception to the prohibition against content-based zon-
ing ordinances. The impact of an ordinance on free expression must be
incidental and minimal to withstand constitutional attack if it has the
effect of restricting access to communication protected by the first
amendment.
57
Criminal Law-BATrERED CHILD SYNDROME-State v. Durfee, 322
N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982).
In 1982, 1.1 million cases of child abuse and neglect were reported in
the United States.i In response to the recognized problem, every state
now requires the reporting of child abuse and neglect cases when discov-
adopted by the St. Paul City Council subsequent to the Alexander decision prohibits adult
entertainment establishments from being located within 200 feet of residential property or
1320 feet from each other in residential neighborhoods; the limit is reduced to 300 feet in
the downtown area. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 16, 1983, at 2B, cols. 5-6.
52. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
53. Schad, 452 U.S. at 70.
54. See supra note 3.
55. Schad, 452 U.S. at 70.
56. Alexander, 698 F.2d at 936.
57. Id at 937.
1. Child Abuse-Laws Being Overhauled to Safeguard Youngsters, 69 A.B.A.J. 1009 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Child Abuse]. Much has been written about child abuse in recent
years. See generally M. COHN, AN APPROACH TO PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE (1981); J.
COSTA & G. NELSON, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PRE-
VENTION (1978); V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD: THE MALTREATMENT SYN-
DROME IN CHILDREN-A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL GUIDE (4th ed. 1979); J.
GIOVANNONI & R. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE (1979); S. NAGI, CHILD MAL-
TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1977); S.
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ered by doctors, nurses, teachers, social workers and families.2 Efforts to
control child abuse are also reflected in the development of Minnesota
case law. 3 In State v. Durfee,4 the Minnesota Supreme Court held, in a
prosecution for assault on a small child by her custodian, medical testi-
mony was admissible to show that the facts and surrounding circum-
stances constituted "battered child syndrome."5
2. ChildAbuse, supra note 1, at 1009; see ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1977 & Supp.
1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010 to .070 (1975 & Supp. 1978); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-546.02 to .03 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807 to -818 (1977 & Supp. 1981);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-66 (West Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10-102 to -
115 (1973 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-38a to -38c (West Supp. 1982);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901-906 (Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2101 to -2119
(1981 & Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(3) (West Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 74-111 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 350-1 to -5 (1976 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO
CODE §§ 16-1619, 16-1620 (Supp. 1983); Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2053, 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-11-
I to -8 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.67-.77 (West Supp. 1982);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-716 to -724 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335 (1982) (repealed
effective July 15, 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4011-4015 (Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A
(1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 722.621-.625 (West Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (1982); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 43-23-9 (1981); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 210.115 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-3-201 to -208 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1501 to -1508 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 200.501-.507 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:29 to -C:39 (Supp. 1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9.6-8.8 to -8.15 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-15 to
-16 (1981); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw §§ 411-415 (MeKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-
543 to -552 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25.1-01 to -14 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 845-48 (West 1983); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 418.740-.775 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-22 (Purdon Supp.
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-2 to -10 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-480 to -
690 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-10-10 to -15 (Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 37-1201 to -1212 (1977 & Supp. 1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-.08
(Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3b-1 to -12 (Supp. 1981); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 681-86 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 63.1-248.1 to .5 (1980 & Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.44.010 to .050, 26.44.060 to .080 (Supp. 1982); W.
VA. CODE §§ 49-6A-1 to -8 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.981 (1)-(12) (1979); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 14-3-201 to -202, -205 to -207 (1978 & Supp. 1983); Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child
Neglect Laws in Amernia, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975).
Many of these statutes have not been very effective because private physicians are
reluctant to report suspected abuse. See Burke, Evidentiay Problems of Proof in Child Abuse
Cases: Why Family and Juvenile Courts Fail, 13 J. FAM. L. 819, 833 n.72 (1973-1974). The
fragmentation of state agencies has also reduced the effectiveness of state reporting stat-
utes. Id at 835.
3. See, e.g., State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982); Schleret v. State, 311
N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981); State v. Gob-
lirsch, 309 Minn. 401, 246 N.W.2d 12 (1976); State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d
404 (1973).
4. 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982).
5. Id. at 784. "Battered child syndrome" is a medical term used to describe "a con-
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Durfee is the most recent in a series of child abuse cases indicating the
court's effort to protect the safety of children without sacrificing the legal
rights of defendants. 6 The decision attempts to strike a balance between
society's interest in the welfare of its children and the accused parent or
custodian's due process rights. Although the court purports to safeguard
a defendant's due process rights, the balance is ultimately struck in favor
of protecting abused children. In Durfee, the defendant was convicted of
first-degree assault on a child, Rose Tittman, by evidence that was pri-
marily circumstantial.
Rose Tittman lived with her mother, Cyndee Tittman, and her
mother's boyfriend, Timothy Durfee. Durfee met Cyndee while attend-
ing an area vocational school and began living with Cyndee and Rose in
mid-summer 1980. Beginning in August, Rose was left with a day-care
person, Jan Polecheck, while Cyndee and the defendant attended
school.8
On September 2, 1980, Mrs. Polecheck discovered a large soft spot on
Rose's head. The following day, Cyndee noticed five or six bruises on
Rose's face. When Cyndee was unable to contact her doctor, Durfee vol-
unteered to take Rose to his family doctor the next day. On September
4th, the defendant was left alone with Rose the entire day while Cyndee
attended school. When Cyndee returned from school, Durfee explained
that the doctor had attributed the red marks and bruises to excessive
levels of sugar in Rose's blood. In fact, Durfee had not taken Rose to the
doctor.9
The next day Durfee related the same "blood sugar" story to Mrs.
Polecheck. On that day, Mrs. Polecheck noticed several bruises on
Rose's face, a reddish-purple line on her ear, two parallel red lines on her
neck, and a deep burn in the palm of her hand. Defendant claimed the
burn occurred when Rose touched a lamp near his aquarium. During
the trial, police officers testified the lamp was not capable of causing such
a burn.' 0
On September 10th, Mrs. Polecheck observed a new large purplish-red
bruise on the side of Rose's head.'" That evening, Cyndee went shop-
ping after putting Rose to bed. While she was gone, Rose was injured
and rendered unconscious. Durfee, who was watching Rose, called for
emergency aid. Durfee first claimed that Rose had fallen out of the crib
6. See supra note 3.
7. See 322 N.W.2d at 780-82. The only direct evidence presented in the case was
that concerning the child's injuries. See id at 784.
8. Id at 780.
9. Id Durfee did consult his mother who was a registered nurse. She believed that
Rose might be eating too much fresh fruit. Id.
10. Id at 780-81.
11. Id When Mrs. Polecheck mentioned the bruise to Cyndee, Cyndee told Mrs.
Polecheck that Durfee had given Rose a root beer float the night before, and the bruise
was a result of Rose's blood sugar problem. Id. at 781.
3
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but later said the crib had collapsed, pinning Rose between the crib and
a wall. The emergency squad noticed "bruises, the burn, the soft spot on
Rose's head, discoloration around the left eye, an open scabbed wound
over the left ear and bruises in the abdomen, groin and pelvic area."12
When Rose arrived at the hospital, the staff notified the police. A
CAT scan showed a blood clot that was compressing the brain. The clot
was removed by surgery, but part of the skull had to be removed result-
ing in a permanent depression in the child's head. As a result of the
injury, Rose was partially paralyzed on her left side and may have per-
manently lost the sight in one eye.
13
On the night of the injury, police officers went to the house to take
photographs of the crib.' 4 Despite the officers' request that Durfee not
touch anything,t 5 Durfee removed a cardboard box from underneath the
crib. Durfee told the police that he was getting some clothes for Rose,
but never brought any clothing to the hospital. Two days later, Durfee
chopped up the crib with an axe.' 6 Instead of putting the pieces of the
crib in a garbage can at the house, he disposed of them at the vocational
school. 17
Originally, both Durfee and Cyndee Tittman were charged with as-
sault, but the charges against Cyndee were dropped. 8 Durfee was tried
twice; his first trial resulted in a hung jury.19 Durfee was convicted at
the second trial, from which he appealed.
20
The main issue in Durfie was whether the introduction of testimony
concerning battered child syndrome violated defendant's due process




15. Respondent's Brief at 7, State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982).
16. 322 N.W.2d at 781. Durfee alleged that he disposed of the crib because Cyndee
became upset when she looked at it. Id
17. Id at 781-82.
18. Id at 782 n.1.
19. Id at 786.
20. Id. at 780.
21. See id at 783-84. There were three other issues decided in Durgfe. First, the Durfee
court held that admission of testimony supporting, but not referring to, "battering parent
syndrome" was admissible for purposes other than to prove "battering parent syndrome."
The court cited State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981), which held that proof of
"battering parent syndrome" is not proper unless a defendant has first put his character in
issue. 322 N.W.2d at 784-85; see a/so infra note 29. Second, the Durfet court held that
photographs of Rose's injuries were properly admitted despite the fact that Durfee stipu-
lated that Rose had sustained great bodily harm. 322 N.W.2d at 785-86. Finally, the
court held that Durfee waived his right to a Schwartz hearing. Id at 786. A Schwartz
hearing is held when there is an allegation ofjuror misconduct. See Schwartz v. Minneap-
olis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960). In Durfee, an alternate
juror promised to vote to acquit Durfee if a witness, Durfee's ex-sister-in-law, complied
with his advances. Although Durfee knew of this misconduct, he did not report it to the
[Vol. 10
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vaded the province of the jury.22 He claimed the battered child syn-
drome evidence, in effect, pointed the finger at him and shifted the
burden of proof from the state to himself.23 To shed light on these con-
tentions, a review of the syndrome and its treatment by the Minnesota
Supreme Court precedes discussion of the Durfee decision.
The phrase "battered child syndrome" was introduced into medical
terminology to describe "a condition by which children are injured other
than by accident." 24 The syndrome usually appears in children less than
four years old and typically culminates in skeletal injuries, the most fre-
quent of which are skull trauma and broken arms and legs. 25 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court described other evidence of battered child
syndrome as follows:
'Battered child syndrome' can be evidenced by multiple injuries in var-
ious stages of healing. Before one injury heals, another injury occurs.
Examples of such successive injuries include bruises, burns, and frac-
tures. The child need not have suffered more than one of those succes-
sive injuries to permit the diagnosis. . . .The succession of harm done
to the child may extend over several months or more, but it may occur
in as brief a time as a few weeks.
26
The Durfee court identified battered child syndrome as comprised of
three elements: (1) an injury which is not caused accidentally; (2) an
explanation given that does not adequately explain the injury; and (3) a
pattern of injuries over a period of time as compared to a single epi-
sode. 27 The crucial factor in identifying the syndrome is any discrepency
between the parent or custodian's explanation of what happened to the
child and medical experts' testimony of what could not have happened,
court or his attorney until after his conviction. 322 N.W.2d at 786. The Derfee court
stated, "A party who learns of a misconduct of a juror during trial may not keep silent and
then attempt to take advantage of it in the event of an adverse verdict." Id
22. Id
23. Id At least one other defendant has raised this contention. See State v. Wilker-
son, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978).
24. Loss, 295 Minn. at 277-78, 204 N.W.2d at 407; see also Durfee, 322 N.W.2d at 783;
Schleret, 311 N.W.2d at 844; Gobl'rsch, 309 Minn. at 407, 246 N.W.2d at 15. A commenta-
tor has stated:
[B]y early 1965, there had come a recognition of a distinctive phenomenon called
'the battered child syndrome' which, though it begins with a pattern of injuries
to the child, is really descriptive of a pattern of conduct on the part of parents or
others who are to guard the welfare of the child.
McCoid, The Battered Chtd and Other Assaults Upon the Family. Part One, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1,
18 (1965). See generally Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, Part Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix and Socal Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293 (1975).
25. Loss, 295 Minn. at 278, 204 N.W.2d at 408; see, e.g., People v. Jackson, 18 Cal.
App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 249 N.Y.S.2d 657,
304 N.E.2d 358 (1973).
26. Schleret, 311 N.W.2d at 844.
27. 322 N.W.2d at 782.
1984]
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or must have happened, to cause the injuries. 28
Testimony concerning the existence of battered child syndrome has
been allowed in Minnesota since 1973, when the court decided State v.
Loss. 29 Although the diagnosis of battered child syndrome is merely cir-
cumstantial evidence, it is often the only evidence existing in child abuse
cases. 30 The unique circumstances justifying the use of battered child
syndrome were explained by the court:
In allowing such evidence to support a conviction, this court has recog-
nized that those felonious assaults are in a unique category. Most cases
of felonious assault tend to occur in a single episode to which there are
sometimes witnesses. By contrast, cases that involve battered child syn-
drome occur in two or more episodes to which there are seldom any
witnesses. In addition, they usually involve harm done by those who
have a duty to protect the child. The harm often occurs when the child
is in the exclusive control of a parent. Usually the child is too young or
too intimidated to testify as to what happened and is easily manipu-
lated on cross-examination.
3 1
28. Shlere, 311 N.W.2d at 845. Professor McCoid elaborates:
The medical description [of battered child syndrome] can perhaps best be sum-
marized as multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily to the long
bones and soft tissues and frequently coupled with poor hygiene and malnutri-
tion, but peculiarly identified by the marked discrepancy between the clinical or
physical findings and the historical data provided by the parents.
McCoid, supra note 24, at 18.
29. 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973). The Loss court held establishment of the
existence of a battered child, together with the reasonable inference of a battering parent,
was sufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree manslaughter in view of other cir-
cumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. Id. at 280, 204 N.W.2d at 409.
Since the battered child syndrome was admitted in Loss, there has also been discus-
sion of the "battering parent syndrome." The Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed
evidence on battering parent syndrome in differing ways, ranging from relevant but not
necessary to inadmissible unless defendant places his character in issue. See State v.
Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981) (inadmissible unless defendant raises character
issue); State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973) (relevant but not necessary).
Durfee claimed that references to his character were intended to identify him as a bat-
tering parent. The Durfee court allowed the testimony stating that references to Durfee's
character were not intended to portray him as a battering parent. The court emphasized
that the State's medical expert did not accuse any specific person; this testimony was only
intended to show that Rose was the victim of abuse. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d at 784; see also
supra note 21.
Other courts admit testimony concerning battered child syndrome. See People v. Ew-
ing, 72 Cal. App. 3d 714, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1977); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d
504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971); Cohoon v. United States, 387 A.2d 1098 (D.C. App. 1978);
People v. Sexton, 31 II1. App. 3d 593, 334 N.E.2d 107 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Boudreau, 362 Mass. 378, 285 N.E.2d 915 (1972); State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. Super. 436, 375
A.2d 1234 (1977); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 249 N.Y.S.2d 657, 304 N.E.2d 358
(1973); State v. Mapp, 45 N.C. App. 574, 264 S.E.2d 348 (1980); State v. Wilkerson, 295
N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978); State v. Best, 89 S.D. 227, 232 N.W.2d 447 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Durfee, 322 N.W.2d at 783; Schleret, 311 N.W.2d at 844; Loss, 295 Minn.
at 281, 204 N.W.2d at 409-10.
31. Shleret, 311 N.W.2d at 844. For a discussion on the lack of admissible evidence in
[Vol. 10
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Recognizing these difficulties, the Minnesota Supreme Court has consis-
tently permitted the use of battered child syndrome testimony for the
limited purpose of showing that a child's injuries were not accidental.32
Evidence of battered child syndrome is not intended to indicate that a
particular person injured the child.33 Although battered child syndrome
has an accusatory tone, "it is intended to indicate only that the child was
not injured accidentally . . . . "34 To protect a defendant's due process
rights, the court continues to require that this form of circumstantial evi-
dence establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 Requiring the prose-
cution to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a heavy burden in
child abuse cases, "[b]ut this is the traditional burden which our system
of criminal justice deems essential."36
As noted above, Durfee contended that testimony concerning battered
child syndrome violated his due process rights by shifting the burden of
proof from the state to himself.37 The state contended that the only bur-
den on the defendant was to refute the factual evidence presented in the
case.38 The Durfee court agreed with the state and held the admission of
testimony concerning the syndrome did not violate Durfee's due process
rights.39
Each of the three elements of battered child syndrome were present in
Durfee. 40 The first element is an injury not caused by accident. 4 1 The
prosecution presented three expert witnesses,42 each of whom testified
child abuse cases, see Comment, Evident'ayt Problems in ChidAbuse Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L.J.
257 (1974).
32. Loss, 295 Minn. at 277-78, 204 N.W.2d at 407; see also Durfee, 322 N.W.2d at 783;
Schleret, 311 N.W.2d at 844; Goblirsch, 309 Minn. at 407, 246 N.W.2d at 15.
33. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d at 783; Gob/:rsch, 309 Minn. at 407, 246 N.W.2d at 15; see also
People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971); People v. Henson, 33
N.Y.2d 63, 249 N.Y.S.2d 657, 304 N.E.2d 358 (1973).
34. 322 N.W.2d at 783.
35. Schleret, 311 N.W.2d at 847 (Wahl, J., dissenting). The Loss court stated:
The applicable rule to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence was
set forth originally in State v. DeZeler, 230 Minn. 39, 52, 41 N.W.2d 313, 322
(1950), which held that circumstantial evidence will support a conviction only
where the facts described by it-
*** * form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so
directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
any reasonable inference other than that of guilt * * *.'
In other words, circumstantial evidence 'must do more than create a suspicion of
guilt. It must point unerringly to the accused's guilt.'
Loss, 295 Minn. at 281, 204 N.W.2d at 409 (citations omitted).
36. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 (1975).
37. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
38. Respondent's Brief at 15-16.
39. 322 N.W.2d at 784.
40. Id. at 782.
41. Id
42. Id. The three medical experts for the State were Dr. Robert Donley, the neuro-
surgeon who performed Rose's skull operation, Dr. Scott Burns, Rose's family physician,
19841
7
et al.: Criminal Law—Battered Child Syndrome—State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
that Rose's head injury could not have been accidental.43 The second
element is a story given by the defendant that does not explain the in-
jury.44 Durfee's explanation of the events leading to the injury was in-
consistent. In fact, the explanation of the accident that he gave at trial
was completely different from that which he told several witnesses the
night Rose was injured.45 Additionally, several witnesses, including the
attending physicians, testified that neither of Durfee's explanations
would account for the severity of the injury.46 The third element of bat-
tered child syndrome is a pattern of injury.47 The facts indicated a pat-
tern of injury stemming over a period of at least eight days. 48 Rose's
body was covered with bruises, scabs, and a burn in various stages of
healing the night she was taken to the hospital.49 Based on these facts,
the court held the three elements of battered child syndrome existed in
Durfee. 50
The defendant was the sole custodian of the child at the time of the
head injury and several of the other injuries.51 In combination with the
severity, type, and number of Rose's injuries, a jury could conclude the
circumstantial evidence was strong enough to find Durfee guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
52
The use of battered child syndrome in criminal cases has been criti-
cized as a violation of due process. Criticism has centered around the
similarities between battered child syndrome and res ipsa loquitur prin-
ciples.53 Battered child syndrome permits an inference that a child was
not injured accidentally. 54 Similarly, res ipsa loquitur permits an infer-
and Dr. Robert ten Bensel, pediatrician and Professor of Public Health and Pediatrics at
the University of Minnesota. Id.
43. Id
44. Id
45. See id at 781.
46. Id at 782.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 780-81.
49. Id. at 781.
50. Id. at 782.
51. Id. at 780-81.
52. Id at 780-82; see also State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1982) (state must
establish each element of crime including intent beyond reasonable doubt); State v. Mar-
tin, 293 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1980) (direct and circumstantial evidence did not prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt); State v. Tibbetts, 281 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. 1979) (state must
prove facts beyond reasonable doubt or defendant denied due process); supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
53. See Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome,
50 CHI. KENT L. REV. 45, 69-70 (1974); Burke, supra note 2, at 848-49; Note, Evidence-
Child Abuse-Expert Medical Testimony Concerning "Battered Child Syndrome" Held Admissible, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 939 (1974); Comment, supra note 31, at 262-63; Casenote, Family
La--Parental Rights-Principles of Res Ipsa Loquitor Apply to Proof of Child Abuse and Neglect, 9
TEX. TECH L. REV. 335 (1977-1978).
54. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. lO
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ence that an event would not have occured but for someone's negli-
gence.55 Although an inference of negligence may be permissible in civil
cases where the case is decided by a preponderance of the evidence, crit-
ics contend that this type of inference is inappropriate in criminal
trials.
56
Some commentators believe the use of battered child syndrome allows
an inference of guilt without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.57 If so,
courts may be violating defendants' due process rights by placing an af-
firmative burden on defendants to prove that a child was injured acci-
dentally.58 As Justice Wahl has noted, Minnesota case law should "not
require an inference that, when a child dies of unknown causes not in-
consistent with accidental causes, the parent responsible for his care is
criminally responsible for his death." 59 The Durfee court comes close to
abandoning the reasonable doubt standard and shifting the burden of
proof in child abuse cases by placing an affirmative burden on defend-
ants to prove accidental injury in cases where the state's evidence is en-
tirely circumstantial.60
55. See generalyW. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (4th ed. 1971).
56. One commentator has stated:
Often the only admissible evidence in child abuse cases is the testimony of an
examining doctor who has found multiple injuries that seem too numerous or
severe to be accidental, and the testimony of the parent who claims that the
injuries were purely accidental. In those civil child abuse proceedings where the
evidence is scarce, circumstantial, or solely within the domain of the defendant,
and where the injury is the sort that would not have occurred if ordinary care
had been used, several jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
to avoid a directed verdict. Such use allows an inference of guilt without proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although this inference may be permissible
in a civil proceeding where the burden of proof is only the preponderance of the
evidence, it could be considered a deprivation of due process in a criminal trial.
Comment, supra note 31, at 262.
57. Id
58. Battered child syndrome is used to show that a child was injured nonac-
cidentally-that someone intentionally assaulted the child. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d at 783.
Although intent is a fact solely within a defendant's knowledge, this does not justify shift-
ing the burden of proof in criminal cases. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975).
In Mullaney, the defendant was accused of murder when he killed a man who had
made sexual advances to him in a hotel room. Under Maine law, it was the defendant's
responsibility to prove that he had been unbearably provoked, and thus have the charge
reduced to manslaughter. Wilbur was unable to prove this to the jury's satisfaction and
was convicted of murder. He appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, claiming
that his right to due process was violated because the burden of proof had shifted to him
to provide affirmative evidence of provocation. The Maine court rejected his appeal. See
State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971). Wilbur eventually prevailed when the United
State Supreme Court held that the due process clause required Maine to prove absence
of provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. 421 U.S. at 704.
59. 311 N.W.2d at 848 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
60. Testimony concerning battered child syndrome could conceivably create an irref-
utable presumption in the minds of the jurors. Nevertheless, a discussion of the stringent
standards the State must meet when attempting to convict a defendant with circumstan-
tial evidence is noticeably absent from the Durfee court's analysis. The court comes closer
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The use of battered child syndrome in criminal cases places a heavy
burden on the courts to protect abused children while safeguarding de-
fendants' due process rights. Although evidence of battered child syn-
drome may be the prosecutor's only incriminating evidence, courts
should temper the use of battered child syndrome testimony because this
powerful form of circumstantial evidence may prejudice the jury.61
Once a defendant is convicted, the jury's decision will seldom be over-
turned because the facts will be reviewed in a light most favorable to a
finding of guilt.
6 2
Notwithstanding these criticisms, in the final analysis, Durfee's due
process argument was properly rejected by the court. The testimony of
the state was consistent with the principles set out in prior cases. 63 The
jury was instructed that the defendant was presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 64 "The burden of going for-
ward with the evidence was not shifted. The state met its burden of
going forward with the evidence and also its burden of proof with the aid
of testimony of an accepted medical diagnosis of 'battered child
syndrome.' "65
State v. Durfee reflects society's increased awareness of the necessity of
protecting the health and welfare of children. The Minnesota Supreme
Court's sanctioning of battered child syndrome testimony solves many of
the evidentiary problems inherent in child abuse cases.66 Durfee avoids
to the "inference that, when a child dies of [or is injured by] unknown causes not inconsis-
tent with accidental causes, the parent responsible for his care is criminally responsi-
ble .. " Id. This conclusion is buttressed by the court's sanction of expert testimony
which concluded that Durfee's denial of the crime was consistent with his guilt. See Ap-
pellant's Brief at 24-25, State v. Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982); cf supra note 35.
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. A battered child syndrome diagnosis
backed by the weight of medical experts might be viewed as prejudicing the jury against a
particular defendant who attempts to explain the cause of a child's accident. Before evi-
dence of battered child syndrome was admitted, on the other hand, juries were often un-
able to believe that a parent could beat a child. See Note, supra note 53, at 939.
62. Loss, 295 Minn. at 281, 204 N.W.2d at 409; see also Gob/irsch, 309 Minn. at 405,
246 N.W.2d at 14; State v. Ellingson, 283 Minn. 208, 167 N.W.2d 55 (1969); State v.
Daml, 282 Minn. 521, 162 N.W.2d 240 (1968).
63. See supra note 35.
64. Respondent's Brief at 16.
65. 322 N.W.2d at 784. "The only burden placed upon the Defendant was self-im-
posed because of his prior lies about the cause of Rose Tittman's injuries and his inconsis-
tent statements. The Defendant himself created a credibility gap with the jury. That was
the only burden he had to overcome." Respondent's Brief at 16.
66. Solutions to the evidentiary problems created by criminal prosecutions may not,
unfortunately, have any effect on the condition of Minnesota's abused children. Although
convictions for child abuse will now be easier to obtain, the value to society of criminal
prosecutions for child abuse has been questioned. Several commentators have suggested
that criminal courts are the least desirable forum for protecting children's safety. For
example, Professor Burke states:
For a variety of reasons, the criminal courts are not favored as judicial forums for
decisions of this kind. First, resort to the criminal courts to adjudicate cases of
[Vol. 10
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the hazard of allowing battered child syndrome testimony to prejudice
the jury against a particular defendant. The court continues to require a
complete chain of evidence showing that a defendant had exclusive con-
trol over the abused child during several episodes of abuse including the
final injury. Thus, the court has controlled the use of a powerful form of
circumstantial evidence-expert testimony identifying "battered child
syndrome."
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Torts-MINNESOTA'S "NEW TORT": INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS--Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., 330
N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs
essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is
today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as
an independent basis of liability.'
These words have been prophetic, particularly in the area of the law
allowing recovery for emotional distress. 2 The movement toward recog-
nition of the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress 3 has been slow but relentless. 4 In light of this trend, the Minnesota
Supreme Court finally joined the majority of jurisdictions recognizing
the "new tort" of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
5
child abuse is not encouraged because of the higher level of proof demabded
under the rules of criminal law and procedure than in either the juvenile or
family courts. Second, the prosecutor must also cope with the requisite level of
intent demanded as an element of the alleged crime.
Burke, supra note 2, at 3 (legal system must protect child without unnecessary disruption
of family); Comment, supra note 31, at 258 (other forums desirable because criminal prose-
cution exacerbates existing family problems).
67. For further reading and an excellent bibliography on the battered child syn-
drome, see 2 AM. JUR. P.O.F.2D 87-90 (Supp. 1982).
1. Note, Torts-Intentional Infiction of Mental Suffenng-A New Tort, 22 MINN. L. REV.
1030, 1031 (1938) (quoting I STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (9th ed.
1912)); see also Handford, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress. Analysis of the Growth of a
Tort, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 1 (1979) ("[Tlhe tort of Intentional Infliction of Mental Dis-
tress now flourishes in the United States.").
2. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971)
(background case progression indicating movement toward expansion of intentional inflic:
tion of emotional distress).
3. Hereinafter referred to as the "new tort."
4. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement formulation of the tort. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977); see also Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Inficttion of Emotional Distress by Out-
rageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 n.9 (1982). See generally W. PROSSER,supra note
2, at 49-50 ("[T]he law is clearly in a process of growth, the ultimate limits of which
cannot as yet be determined.").
5. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983).
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